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1  Introduction
We live in a contingent world, a world that could have been different.  A common way to deal with this
contingency  is  by  positing  the  existence  of  all  possibilities.   This,  however,  doesn’t  get  rid  of  the
contingency – it merely moves it from the third-person view to the first-person view.
2  Haecceity
The haecceity of the world is its contingent thisness – the fact that is it what it is, even though it could
have been different.  One way to account for it is by postulating a total.
D. K. Lewis posited the existence of all possible worlds, thereby removing the special status of our world
relative to others.  Many people have proposed a multiverse, for instance to explain the anthropic effect.
Max Tegmark has proposed that all finitely-describable mathematical structures exist.
All these approaches have as their effect that the third-person contingency, the haecceity, of the total
thus posited disappears.
3  Thrownness
I am thrown in this world, in this place and time, with this mind and body.  That is my existential given,
and  the  place  from where  I  must  live  my life.   Martin  Heidegger  called  this  my  Geworfenheit,  my
“thrownness”.  Though I see others, and can imagine myself, in different situations, I shall have to come
to terms with me being what I am, and from there to become what I ought or want to be.  I have no other
option.
4  Duality
Max Tegmark has introduced the useful concept of our  address in the multiverse: we are here, and not
elsewhere.  The larger the multiverse, the larger also our address.  But that address is precisely the third-
person representation of my thrownness – it describes what I am relative to what I could or might have
been.
My thrownness is precisely the contingency that matters to me – and it still bears all the philosophical
questions that apply to third-person contingency, only with a “me” pointer in them.  “Why is1 the world
this way (of all the ways it could have been)?” merely becomes “Why do I have2 this address (of all the
addresses I could have had)?”
The fact that with most other addresses I would not have been a rational, living, or even physical being is
hardly an answer – it answers why given that I can ask this question I am here, but that given is already
part of the question itself.   If a peloton of twenty sharp-shooters shoot at me from close range and I
survive, I have all reason to be amazed, and the fact that if I hadn’t survived I wouldn’t have been there
to be not amazed doesn’t change that.
Given the questionable meaning of  “existence” when applied to worlds one cannot even in principle
observe, the first-person question is the more important one, and positing many worlds – whatever their
factual status –  does not eliminate contingency, but helps in bringing the question of our thrownness into
focus.
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1 Or “did God make”, and so on.
2 Or “did God give me”, and so on.
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